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Abstract—The physical-layer key generation is a lightweight
technique to generate secret keys from wireless channels for
resource-constrained Internet of things (IoT) applications. The
security of key generation relies on spatial decorrelation, which
assumes that eavesdroppers observe uncorrelated channel mea-
surements when they are located over a half-wavelength away
from legitimate users. Unfortunately, there is no experimental
validation for communications environments when there are
large-scale and small-scale fading effects. Furthermore, while
the current key generation work mainly focuses on short-
range communications techniques such as WiFi and ZigBee,
the exploration with long-range communications, e.g., LoRa, is
rather limited. This paper presents a LoRa-based key generation
testbed and reveals a new colluding-eavesdropping attack that
perceives and utilizes large-scale fading effects in key generation
channels, by using multiple eavesdroppers circularly around
a legitimate user. We formalized the attack and validated it
through extensive experiments conducted under both indoor and
outdoor environments. It is corroborated that the attack reduces
secret key capacity when large-scale fading is predominant. We
further investigated potential defenses by proposing a conditional
entropy and high-pass filter-based countermeasure to estimate
and eliminate large-scale fading associated components. The
experimental results demonstrated that the countermeasure can
significantly improve the key generation’s security when there are
both varying large-scale and small-scale fading effects. The key
bits generated by legitimate users have a low key disagreement
rate (KDR) and validated by the NIST randomness tests. On the
other hand, eavesdroppers’ average KDR is increased to 0.49,
which is no better than a random guess.
Index Terms—Eavesdropping attack, key generation, large-
scale fading, long-range communications
I. INTRODUCTION
INTERNET of things (IoT) has triggered extensive excitingapplications, including health monitoring, environmental
sensing, industrial control, etc [1]. Information security of
IoT networks is essential as the information exchanged may
be essential, private, and sensitive [2]. It is usually achieved
by the symmetric encryption algorithms and key distribu-
tion schemes. The former, e.g., advanced encryption standard
(AES), is used to protect the data using a symmetric key.
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The latter is currently handled by the conventional public-key
cryptography (PKC), such as the elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) key exchange. PKC schemes rely on complicated
mathematical problems, such as discrete logarithm. Hence,
they are computationally expensive, which results in high
power consumption and may not be suitable for resource-
constrained IoT devices [3]. Furthermore, managing the PKC
in decentralized IoT networks is difficult as the public key
infrastructure may not always be available [4], [5]. Finally,
PKC schemes will become vulnerable to the emerging quan-
tum computers because they are not scalable [6].
In order to address this challenge in particular for the low-
cost IoT devices, there is an alternative technique named key
generation from wireless channels, which has attracted exten-
sive research interests [3], [7], [8]. This technique exploits
the randomness from the common wireless channel between a
pair of users to generate secret keys; hence, it is information-
theoretically secure [9], [10]. In addition, it is not complicated
and consumes much less power compared with PKC schemes,
which is suitable for low-cost IoT devices. For example,
Zenger et al. implemented a key generation protocol on an
8-bit Intel MCS-51 micro-controller, and showed the energy
cost to generate a 128-bit secret key is 98 times less than that
of the ECDH key exchange [11].
Key generation mainly exploits multipath [12], and employs
the randomness in the temporal [13], [14], frequency [15]–
[17], and spatial domains [17]–[19]. Local induced random-
ness enhances the key generation performance of the imple-
mentation in a multipath limited environment [20], [21]. The
security level of the key generation against eavesdropping
relies on spatial decorrelation. It describes that in a multipath
rich environment when an eavesdropper is more than a half-
wavelength away from legitimate users, the eavesdropper
experiences an uncorrelated channel, hence the eavesdropper
cannot infer the correct keys. This assumption is determined
from the Bessel function developed for a sum of multipath sig-
nals [22]. It is the core interest to validate the spatial decorre-
lation assumption in practice [23]–[25]. Edman et al. designed
a ZigBee-based testbed and experimentally demonstrated that
the eavesdropper’s capability of secret key inference reduces
as the distance between an eavesdropper to legitimate users
increases [23]; they also found that the required distance for
securing at least 50% secret key information is far more
than a half-wavelength. Zhang et al. constructed a WiFi-
based testbed and also carried out extensive measurements
in different environments, including an anechoic chamber (no
multipath), a reverberation chamber (very rich multipath), and
an indoor office (normal multipath) [24]. They found that key
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2generation security significantly relies on the multipath levels
of the environments. In particular, the secure distance should
be much larger than a half-wavelength in an environment
where multipath is limited. However, none of them provided
corresponding countermeasures against eavesdropping. In ad-
dition, all the above experimental validation was performed
with short-range communications; the spatial decorrelation
assumption is not clear in long-range communications when
large-scale fading is present.
In practice, eavesdroppers may seek collusion to reveal more
information in key generation. Thai et al. investigated and
proposed a multi-antenna-based scheme that achieves high
secret key rates over colluding eavesdroppers and non-trusted
relays [26]. Waqas et al. investigated secret key generation
as eavesdroppers collude in a social network and designed
an algorithm for high secret key generation rates [27], [28].
These works rely on multiple antennas or relays, which may
not apply to the networks deployed with low-cost IoT devices.
IoT can be categorized into wireless local area networks
(WLAN), wireless personal area networks (WPAN) as well as
low-power wide-area networks (LPWAN). WLAN and WPAN
are usually using short-range communications, such as WiFi
and ZigBee, respectively. Key generation has been mainly
applied with them, such as WiFi [24], [29], ZigBee [30], and
Bluetooth [31]. As a matter of fact, there have been extensive
measurements campaign to demonstrate the feasibility of this
technique with these communications technologies.
LPWAN is an important component of IoT with represen-
tative technologies such as LoRa and Narrowband Internet
of Things (NB-IoT) and has become the key enabler of
many transformative IoT applications [32]. In comparison
with WLAN and WPAN, key generation applied with LP-
WAN is rather limited, with some preliminary experimental
explorations reported in [33]–[37] and simulation work on
large-scale fading for key generation [38]. Ruotsalainen et
al. investigated the effects of LoRa setup on key generation
performance [33], [37]. Zhang et al. designed a differential
value-based key generation protocol for LoRa and validated
the performance in both indoor and urban environments [35].
Xu et al. also proposed a LoRa-based protocol and carried
out extensive experiments [36]. However, a systematic in-
vestigation of eavesdropping attacks on the LoRa-based key
generation is currently missing and urgently required for
security validation. In practice, there will be barely non-hostile
key generation environments as the LPWAN is often de-
ployed under insufficient surveillance. For example, networks
deployed on highways, farmlands, and national parks face
various threats to reduce the secret key capacity, constrain the
key generation rate, and eventually compromise the key.
The above research challenges motivated us to investigate
the key generation against a group of colluding eavesdroppers
and design a secure long-range key generation protocol under
the impact of large-scale fading. The revealed attack and
countermeasure are new, considering the facts as follows.
1) Large-scale fading has not been targeted to leak secret
keys in key generation, and it is naturally present in
long-range communications.
2) The spatial decorrelation assumption was not practically
validated in the presence of large-scale fading variation,
and it is the ground of the key generation security.
3) No work has been done on a high-pass filter implemen-
tation to improve the key generation security.
Our contributions are listed as follows.
• We designed a LoRa-based testbed and carried out exten-
sive experiments to investigate the impact of large-scale
fading on key generation.
• We revealed a new colluding-eavesdropping attack
guided by our formalization to validate the spatial decor-
relation assumption. The attack perceives large-scale fad-
ing effects in key generation channels, by using mul-
tiple eavesdroppers circularly around a legitimate user.
The experimental results demonstrated that the colluding
eavesdroppers can infer a higher portion of secret keys
utilizing large-scale fading variation. We also demon-
strated that the secret key inference capability of the
colluding-eavesdropping attack can be boosted by the
signal pre-processing techniques that are often adopted
in practice to enhance the key generation.
• We accordingly provided a high-pass filter-based coun-
termeasure to mitigate the effect of this newly revealed
colluding-eavesdropping attack. In particular, key gen-
eration users can estimate large-scale fading associated
low-frequency components using their channel observa-
tions and remove them. The results showed that the
key leakage was mitigated as colluding eavesdroppers’
KDR increased significantly. The NIST randomness tests
validated the randomness of the large-scale fading filtered
key bits.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the preliminary knowledge of the channel effect
for key generation. Section III presents the new colluding-
eavesdropping attack and formalizes its large-scale fading
estimation and secret key inference capabilities. Section IV
describes the experimental setup as well as analytical met-
rics, and Section V presents the experimental analysis. Sec-
tion VI proposes the countermeasure against the colluding-
eavesdropping attack. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARY
Channel effect is a superposition of small-scale fading and
large-scale fading [22]. Small-scale fading is caused by the
constructive and destructive interference of signals due to
reflection, diffraction, and scattering. It is unpredictable as it
can be affected by even a very slight movement. Hence, it
introduces randomness to received signal characteristics over
a short time and distance.
In contrast, large-scale fading introduces a more significant
attenuation to the received signal over a long distance, which is
consisted of path loss and shadow fading. Path loss describes
the signal attenuation along with the distance while shadowing
is caused by the blocking of large obstacles such as buildings.
3From a far-field transmitter to a receiver, the path loss effect
in the linear scale can be expressed as [22]
Pr,lin = Pt,linGlin
(
d0
d
)γ
, (1)
where Pt,lin is the transmission power, Glin denotes the
combined system gains, γ is the path loss exponent, d0 is the
reference distance, and d is the distance from the transmitter
to the receiver.
For the simplification of notation, the received power is
usually represented in the logarithm scale. The overall received
power affected by both the path loss and shadow fading can
be given as [22]
Pr = Pt +G− 10γ log10
(
d
d0
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
path loss
− χ︸︷︷︸
shadowing
, (2)
where Pt and G are the transmission power and system gains
in the logarithm scale, and χ is a log-normal distributed
shadowing component with a zero mean (µχ = 0 dB).
As most of the existing key generation works focus on
short-range communications such as WiFi, small-scale fading
has been exploited as their random sources [12], [15], [24].
Following the initial LoRa-based work in [33]–[37], this paper
will take a step further to investigate the key generation
performance when there are large-scale fading and small-
scale fading effects. In particular, its security against a large-
scale fading resulted colluding-eavesdropping attack will be
examined.
III. A NEW LARGE-SCALE FADING RESULTED
COLLUDING-EAVESDROPPING ATTACK
Two legitimate users, namely Alice and Bob, wish to
generate the same key from the randomness of their com-
mon wireless channel. This will require channel probing,
which involves bidirectional wireless transmissions between
Alice and Bob. They will alternately transmit probing signals.
Thanks to the channel reciprocity property, when the probing
delay is much smaller than the coherence time, hAB = hBA
will hold, where huv is the channel effect between users
u and v. Hence, both users will obtain highly correlated
received signal characteristics that can be exploited to generate
secret keys. We used the received signal strength indicator
(RSSI) as it is readily accessible for LPWAN devices. Far-
field communications are assumed when the distance between
Alice and Bob is d meters and much larger than the carrier
wavelength. LPWAN technologies like LoRa and NB-IoT are
designed for long-range communications; thus, it is reasonable
to make the assumption.
When Alice and Bob are carrying out channel probing, a
group of eavesdroppers can also receive all the transmissions
due to the broadcast nature of wireless communications. This
work considers such an attack as a colluding-eavesdropping
attack, which is portrayed in Fig. 1. We consider M eaves-
droppers uniformly and circularly distributed around Alice at a
distance of r, where r is larger than a half-carrier-wavelength.
The antenna gains of Alice, Bob, and the eavesdroppers are
Fig. 1. A key generation setup with the large-scale fading resulted colluding-
eavesdropping attack; four eavesdroppers are used for illustration.
identical. The eavesdroppers passively receive the probing
signals from Bob and collude to deduce the received power at
Alice. For the m-th Eve, her distance to Bob can be given as
dB−Em =
√
d2 + r2 − 2dr cos
(
α+
2pi(m− 1)
M
)
, (3)
where α is the angle between the path of Alice and Bob and
the path of Alice and the first eavesdropper. The power resulted
from path loss at the m-th Eve is PEmr,lin. The average power
is given as
P
E
r,lin =
1
M
M∑
m=1
PEmr,lin
=
1
M
M∑
m=1
Pt,linGlin
(
d0
dB−Em
)γ
. (4)
As eavesdroppers aim to obtain accurate observations, they
are usually not far from legitimate users, i.e., r is small. Hence,
d  r reasonably holds in LPWAN, and then dB−Em ≈ d.
We have
P
E
r,lin ≈ Pt,linGlin
(d0
d
)γ
. (5)
The averaged received power affected by both the path loss
and shadow fading in the logarithm scale can be given as
Pr
E ≈ Pt +G− 10γ log10
(
d
d0
)
− χE , (6)
where χE denotes the average shadowing.
Regarding the probing signals sent from Bob to Alice, the
RSSI of Alice is denoted by PAr and follows the same form
as (2). According to (2) and (6), the difference between the
estimated power via colluding-eavesdropping and the power
resulted from large-scale fading at Alice can be given as
Pr
E − PAr = χ− χE . (7)
The large-scale fading estimation is also affected by small-
scale fading. According to the central limit theorem, a large M
can minimize the small-scale fading introduced uncertainty. In
practice, a large number of eavesdroppers can be discovered
by legitimate users easily. Hence, we used a small number,
only four eavesdroppers, in our experiments to demonstrate
the colluding-eavesdropping attack, with reduced estimation
accuracy resulted from small-scale fading.
4Fig. 2. Outdoor experimental environment and the trajectory of Bob.
TABLE I
LORA CONFIGURATION
Carrier
Frequency Bandwidth
Transmission
Power
Spreading
Factor
Coding
Rate
915 MHz 500 kHz 17 dBm 7 4/5
TABLE II
EXPERIMENTAL CHANNEL SUMMARY
Scenario Channel Variation
(a) Static channel Noise
(b) Moving scatterers Small-scale fadingand noise
(c) Moving Bob
Large-scale fading,
small-scale fading,
and noise
(d) Moving Boband moving scatterers
Large-scale fading,
small-scale fading,
and noise
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND ANALYTICAL METRICS
A. Experimental Setup
We used six Arduino Nano controlled LoRa SX1276 mod-
ules in our experiments, to act as Alice, Bob, and four
eavesdroppers, respectively. Each module was equipped with
an omnidirectional antenna. The LoRa configuration specifi-
cations are given in Table I.
We placed six LoRa modules, as shown in Fig. 1. We
considered four different scenarios, as detailed in Table II.
There was no large-scale fading variation in scenarios (a) and
(b) as both Alice and Bob were static. In contrast, there was
large-scale fading variation in scenarios (c) and (d) because
Bob was moving.
Extensive experiments were conducted in both indoor and
outdoor environments.
• In the indoor environment, all the six devices were placed
on the same floor of an apartment building, and there was
no line-of-sight from Bob to Alice and the eavesdroppers.
The indoor experiments covered all four scenarios, and
we used (Ia), (Ib), (Ic), and (Id) to represent them, hence
to ease the description after.
• The setup of the outdoor environment is shown in Fig. 2.
Alice and eavesdroppers were placed on a deck in the
middle of a pedestrian bridge. Direct line-of-sight paths
were present most of the time between Bob and Alice
as well as between Bob and eavesdroppers. The outdoor
experiments involved scenarios (b) and (d) as we were not
able to control the behavior of scatterers, e.g., pedestrian.
We accordingly used (Ob) and (Od) to represent the
outdoor scenarios.
For scenarios (Ic), (Id), and (Od), Bob walked randomly with
an average speed of 1 m/s to introduce large-scale fading
variation. We varied the distance r to 2λ, 3λ, 4λ, and 5λ
for each scenario. The wavelength λ is approximately 0.33 m
when the carrier frequency is 915 MHz.
For each experiment, in the n-th probing, Alice first trans-
mits a packet with 20 ms airtime to Bob who will measure
the RSSI, PBr (n); Bob will then transmit a packet with 20 ms
airtime to Alice who will measure the RSSI, PAr (n). Fixed
payloads and data rates maintain the airtime; the channel
coherence time in the experiments is longer than 100 ms.
The channel reciprocity can thus be ensured. Meanwhile, the
m-th Eve will receive the packet from Bob and measure the
RSSI, PEmr (n). Alice and Bob will keep the above channel
probing process until they collect sufficient samples. For the
simplification of notation, we use Xu(n) = Pur (n) to denote
a measured RSSI sample at the party u in the n-th probing,
where u = {A,B,Em} denotes Alice, Bob, and the m-th
eavesdropper, respectively. XEc(n) denotes the RSSI sample
estimated by the colluding-eavesdropping attack, i.e., Pr
E
.
Alice and Bob carried out channel probing for more than three
minutes and collected at least N = 10,000 RSSI samples.
B. Analytical Metrics
We used cross-correlation, secret key capacity, and intact
key information ratio as the analytical metrics.
1) Cross-Correlation: The Pearson correlation coefficient
for the RSSI sequences measured by Alice and Bob and the
m-th eavesdropper is defined as
ρu,v =
∑N
n=1[(Xu(n)− µu)(Xv(n)− µv)]√∑N
n=1(Xu(n)− µu)2
√∑N
n=1(Xv(n)− µv)2
,
(8)
where u = A and v = B,Ec, Em, m = 1, 2, 3, 4. When
eavesdroppers obtain correlated RSSI sequences, they can
develop an accurate secret key inference.
2) Secret Key Capacity: The secret key capacity describes
the maximum achievable key generation rate [10], [39]. It can
be expressed as
CK = min[I(XA;XB), I(XA;XB |XEm), I(XA;XB |XEc)].
(9)
In our analysis, CK is upper-bounded by the minimum among
the mutual information of Alice and Bob, the conditional mu-
tual information given by an eavesdropper, and the conditional
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Fig. 3. RSSI sequences in indoor experiments (4000 samples in each sequence are selected for demonstration). (a) Static scenario (Ia). (b) Channel with
moving scatterers (Ib). (c) Channel with moving Bob (Ic). (d) Channel with moving Bob and moving scatterers (Id).
mutual information given by the colluding-eavesdropping at-
tack. A higher CK stands for more key bits can be generated
from an RSSI sequence.
3) Intact Key Information Ratio: The intact key information
ratio is defined as
RCK =
CK
I(XA;XB)
. (10)
The ratio determines the proportion of an RSSI sequence
that is not leaked. RCK closes to one is desirable as it
indicates eavesdroppers have the least information related to
key generation.
V. ATTACK RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Fig. 3 shows the RSSI sequences measured by Alice and
Bob in the scenarios (Ia), (Ib), (Ic), and (Id) of the indoor
experiments. As can be observed from Fig. 3(a), there was
only little random variation at Alice and Bob, which would not
be suitable for key generation. Comparing the Fig. 3(b) with
Fig. 3(c) and Fig. 3(d), large-scale fading brought significant
RSSI changes. This section firstly investigated the impact
of large-scale fading variation on key generation through
cross-correlation and secret key capacity analysis. Then, we
investigated the effect of signal pre-processing on the intact
key information ratio.
A. Cross-Correlation Analysis
Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 show the cross-correlation analysis results
for indoor and outdoor experiments, respectively. The red bars
are obtained by calculating the highest Pearson correlation
coefficient among the four eavesdroppers and Alice. Hence,
it represents the optimal capability of secret key inference
developed by a single eavesdropper. The black bar is obtained
by calculating the Pearson correlation coefficient between the
colluding-eavesdropping attack and Alice.
In the static scenario (Ia), |ρA,B | is very small, which echos
the RSSI sequence shown in Fig. 3(a). This is because the
signal variation is introduced by hardware thermal noise and/or
interference, which are not correlated. Key generation in static
scenarios will thus not be feasible.
One observation from the figures is that the colluding-
eavesdropping attack in the scenarios (Ic) and (Id) pro-
duces higher coefficients than any single eavesdropper. Bob
was stationary in the scenarios (Ia) and (Ib), the colluding-
eavesdropping attack does not outperform a single eaves-
dropper. Bob was mobile in the scenarios (Ic) and (Id), the
colluding-eavesdropping attack obtains more channel informa-
tion generated by large-scale fading to improve channel cor-
relation with Alice. On average, the colluding-eavesdropping
attack obtained an additional 15% channel information when
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Fig. 4. Cross-correlation results in indoor experiments. |ρA,B | denotes the absolute Pearson correlation coefficient between Alice and Bob. max(|ρA,Em |)
denotes the maximum coefficient between Alice and eavesdroppers. |ρA,Ec | denotes the coefficient between Alice and the colluding-eavesdropping attack.
(a) Static scenario (Ia). (b) Channel with moving scatterers (Ib). (c) Channel with moving Bob (Ic). (d) Channel with moving Bob and moving scatterers (Id).
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Fig. 5. Cross-correlation results in outdoor experiments. (a) Channel with moving scatterers (Ob). (b) Channel with moving Bob and moving scatterers (Od).
Bob was mobile. In all the dynamic scenarios, the cross-
correlation coefficients between Alice and Bob are much
higher.
B. Secret Key Capacity Analysis
Table III and Table IV present the secret key capacity
analysis results for indoor and outdoor experiments, respec-
tively. The I(XA;XB) demonstrates the maximum obtainable
CK when there was no eavesdropping. The elements in red
color denote the true secret key capacity when eavesdropping
occurred.
Observing Table III, the results can be summarized into
three categories.
• Scenario (Ia). The scenario (Ia) produces the lowest value
of I(XA;XB) because only noise was available in the
static scenario. Unfortunately, hardware thermal noise is
independent at each device, and there is no correlation
between two devices; hence, it is not suitable for key
generation.
7TABLE III
SECRET KEY CAPACITY IN INDOOR EXPERIMENTS
Scenario r I(XA;XB) I(XA;XB |XE1 ) I(XA;XB |XE2 ) I(XA;XB |XE3 ) I(XA;XB |XE4 ) I(XA;XB |XEc )
(Ia)
5λ 0.0293 0.0297 0.0237 0.0289 0.0282 0.0273
4λ 0.0225 0.0081 0.0187 0.0223 0.0126 0.0233
3λ 0.0110 0.0084 0.0089 0.0064 0.0092 0.0095
2λ 0.0160 0.0129 0.0151 0.0143 0.0111 0.0127
(Ib)
5λ 1.2830 1.2024 1.2310 1.2706 1.2634 1.2543
4λ 1.0166 0.9954 0.9647 0.9967 0.9596 0.9624
3λ 0.9167 0.9046 0.9019 0.8439 0.8437 0.8487
2λ 0.5888 0.5475 0.4988 0.5233 0.5873 0.5241
(Ic)
5λ 0.8479 0.7487 0.7396 0.7474 0.7446 0.6714
4λ 1.0165 0.8802 0.8988 0.8573 0.9376 0.8028
3λ 0.7744 0.6776 0.7080 0.6731 0.6685 0.6014
2λ 1.1411 1.0241 1.0024 1.0216 1.0246 0.9156
(Id)
5λ 0.7600 0.6784 0.6860 0.6777 0.6638 0.5723
4λ 1.0533 0.9055 0.9239 0.9512 0.9850 0.8601
3λ 0.7013 0.5619 0.5256 0.5542 0.5695 0.4366
2λ 1.3026 1.0578 1.0565 1.1360 1.0934 0.9293
TABLE IV
SECRET KEY CAPACITY IN OUTDOOR EXPERIMENTS
Scenario r I(XA;XB) I(XA;XB |XE1 ) I(XA;XB |XE2 ) I(XA;XB |XE3 ) I(XA;XB |XE4 ) I(XA;XB |XEc )
(Ob)
5λ 0.7933 0.7657 0.6987 0.7684 0.7506 0.7665
4λ 0.7864 0.5621 0.6858 0.7509 0.7566 0.6711
3λ 1.0384 1.0133 0.8552 1.0295 0.9181 1.0284
2λ 0.9759 0.9315 0.8663 0.7616 0.9324 0.8034
(Od)
5λ 0.9215 0.8117 0.7628 0.7474 0.7302 0.6365
4λ 0.8361 0.7123 0.6647 0.6741 0.7556 0.5786
3λ 1.0646 0.9414 0.9027 0.8428 0.9591 0.7822
2λ 1.1463 0.9958 0.9758 0.9736 1.0191 0.8612
• Scenario (Ib). There was no large-scale fading variation
in the scenario, hence the colluding-eavesdropping at-
tack has no chance to reduce the secret key capacity.
I(XA;XB |XEc) is not the smallest value.
• Scenarios (Ic) and (Id). Large-scale fading changed in the
scenarios (Ic) and (Id), and the large-scale fading estima-
tion perceived these changes that introduce randomness to
the key generation between Alice and Bob. Therefore, the
colluding-eavesdropping attack outperformed any single
eavesdropper. This is corroborated from the table as the
I(XA;XB |XEc) is always the smallest for these two
scenarios.
The same pattern can be observed from Table IV that is
corresponding to outdoor experiments.
C. Intact Key Information Ratio Analysis
In the indoor experiments, an average of 92.1% RSSI
information was never leaked in the scenario (Ib), 79.1%
in the scenario (Ic), and 73.3% in the scenario (Id). In the
outdoor experiments, the value was 80.1% in the scenario
(Ob) and 72.0% in the scenario (Od). For RSSI sequences
with the same number of samples, the sequences generated in
large-scale fading varying channels leaked more samples to
the colluding-eavesdropping attack, hence fewer secret keys
were generated. In practice, key generation users can develop
additional channel probing to compensate for the secret key
loss, but this will also increase the key generation cost.
Signal pre-processing techniques are commonly employed
in key generation to improve the channel reciprocity [40]–
[43]. Most research claims that their approaches are effective
in noise cancellation and improving the cross-correlation of
channel measurements. They help to reduce the key generation
cost, which is desirable for resource-constrained IoT devices.
However, applying noise cancellation in large-scale fading-
based key generation may reduce the intact key information
ratio. In other words, we reveal that there is a trade-off between
the benefit brought by the noise cancellation and the security
deduction of the key generation. The detailed analysis is shown
as follows.
A moving window average (MWA) technique is investigated
as it is practical and convenient to reduce noise. The MWA
window sizes include 0, 5, 15, 25, 35, and 45, where 0
stands for no MWA processing. After applying MWA on the
experimental RSSI sequences, we calculated the new intact
key information ratio using (10). Table V and Table VI show
the results for indoor and outdoor experiments, respectively.
As can be observed from Table V, in the scenarios (Ib),
(Ic), and (Id), the intact key information ratio reduces as the
MWA window size increases. The reduction is significant in
the large-scale fading varying scenarios, e.g., (Ic) and (Id). The
average reduction is 2.32% without large-scale fading variation
and 9.77% with large-scale fading variation. From Table VI,
the average reduction is 2.86% for large-scale fading invariant
scenarios and 11.52% for varying large-scale fading scenarios
in the outdoor experiments.
We deduce the reason for the more significant reduction
is that the MWA reduces noise and small-scale fading at
the same time. In the scenarios (Ic), (Id), and (Od), the
small-scale fading reduction makes large-scale fading variation
contributed to a higher portion of the channel information
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INTACT KEY INFORMATION RATIO ANALYSIS RESULTS OF AN MWA APPLICATION IN INDOOR EXPERIMENTS
Scenario r W.Size(0) W.Size(5) W.Size(15) W.Size(25) W.Size(35) W.Size(45) ∆[W.Size(45), (0)]
(Ia)
5λ 80.88% 76.89% 77.21% 75.35% 72.39% 71.97% −8.91%
4λ 36.17% 61.09% 55.47% 49.35% 40.72% 47.21% +11.04%
3λ 58.75% 77.94% 91.07% 51.98% 74.93% 80.76% +22.01%
2λ 69.36% 76.78% 84.35% 83.91% 83.85% 82.91% +13.55%
(Ib)
5λ 93.72% 93.85% 93.62% 92.21% 91.13% 90.64% −3.08%
4λ 94.39% 94.61% 94.12% 93.10% 92.45% 92.13% −2.26%
3λ 92.04% 91.65% 91.36% 89.88% 89.49% 88.60% −3.44%
2λ 85.95% 85.74% 85.05% 85.21% 85.60% 85.46% −0.49%
(Ic)
5λ 79.18% 79.15% 77.69% 74.60% 71.27% 68.75% −10.43%
4λ 78.98% 78.37% 75.91% 74.21% 71.58% 69.34% −9.64%
3λ 77.66% 77.68% 76.80% 74.10% 71.99% 70.49% −7.17%
2λ 80.24% 79.46% 76.62% 73.15% 71.10% 69.76% −10.48%
(Id)
5λ 75.30% 74.97% 72.76% 69.86% 66.34% 64.67% −10.63%
4λ 81.66% 80.69% 79.69% 77.21% 75.02% 74.42% −7.24%
3λ 62.25% 61.52% 62.07% 58.43% 53.72% 50.05% −12.20%
2λ 71.34% 71.09% 67.87% 65.20% 63.39% 61.00% −10.34%
TABLE VI
INTACT KEY INFORMATION RATIO ANALYSIS RESULTS OF AN MWA APPLICATION IN OUTDOOR EXPERIMENTS
Scenario r W.Size(0) W.Size(5) W.Size(15) W.Size(25) W.Size(35) W.Size(45) ∆[W.Size(45), (0)]
(Ob)
5λ 88.08% 88.01% 86.20% 86.34% 85.57% 86.15% −1.93%
4λ 71.47% 74.60% 74.79% 72.06% 70.13% 70.06% −1.41%
3λ 80.43% 81.21% 80.79% 80.16% 78.66% 77.09% −3.34%
2λ 78.04% 78.43% 76.99% 76.06% 73.61% 73.30% −4.74%
(Od)
5λ 69.07% 68.80% 67.34% 63.89% 62.01% 62.10% −6.97%
4λ 69.20% 68.56% 65.47% 62.60% 59.29% 57.47% −11.73%
3λ 73.47% 73.15% 69.04% 65.37% 62.97% 60.73% −12.74%
2λ 75.12% 74.05% 70.41% 65.73% 62.87% 60.48% −14.64%
shared between key generation users. Hence, the colluding-
eavesdropping attack can take advantage of the large-scale
fading estimation to obtain more users’ mutual information.
Therefore, we argue that the claim of noise canceling-based
signal pre-processing helps to reduce the channel probing cost,
is in doubt for the key generation developed in a channel with
varying large-scale fading and small-scale fading effects.
VI. A HIGH-PASS FILTERING-BASED COUNTERMEASURE
Small-scale fading is more random than large-scale fading
because it can be affected by very slight movements. Hence,
the key generation security can be improved against the
colluding-eavesdropping attack if we can mitigate the large-
scale fading and mainly leverage small-scale fading.
A. Countermeasure
Large-scale fading varies in a much slower manner com-
pared to small-scale fading variation. This inspires us to devise
a high-pass filtering approach to minimize the impact of large-
scale fading variation. Discrete cosine transform (DCT) is
commonly used in signal processing nowadays, and DCT-II
is regarded as the most common DCT variant [44], which is
adopted in this paper. To the best knowledge of the authors,
this is the first key generation study regarding filtering low-
frequency components, while the other research focuses on
filtering high-frequency components [40], [43], [45].
Identifying large-scale fading associated low-frequency
components is of importance as excessive filtering leads to
a significant secret key capacity drop. Therefore, we designed
an algorithm exploiting conditional entropy to estimate the
optimal filter size, as shown in Algorithm 1. Without loss
of generality, we assume Bob will be responsible for the
estimation and will send the estimated filter size to Alice. Both
users will then carry out the DCT-based filtering.
Specifically, Bob will first transform his RSSI sequence to
a sum of cosine components at different frequencies using
DCT-II expression (line 1), given as
Yu(z) =
N∑
n=1
Xu(n) cos
[
pi
N
(
n+
1
2
)
z
]
, z = 0, ..., N − 1.
(11)
Bob then sets YB(z), z = 1, 2, ..., Z, as zero to cumulatively
remove the low-frequency components (line 3). Subsequently,
an inverse discrete cosine transform (IDCT) is used to trans-
form the new YB back to a filtered RSSI sequence, X
f
B,z
(line 4). After that, Bob will calculate the conditional entropy
H(XB |XfB,z) (line 5), which increases with filtered compo-
nents. The increasing rate, denoted by ∇H(XB |XfB,z), is not
constant because large-scale fading changes more significantly
than small-scale fading in magnitude. Bob will find the posi-
tion of the largest increasing rate. The determined optimal filter
size denoted by z0, is the largest rate position added by one
(line 6), as the increasing rate is calculated on a midpoint.
Bob will send z0 to Alice (line 7). Finally, Alice and Bob
can obtain the filtered sequences, XfA,z0 , X
f
B,z0
, respectively
(line 8).
9Algorithm 1: Large-Scale Fading Filtering Algorithm.
Input: XA,XB %RSSI sequences of Alice and Bob
Input: Z % Maximum filter size
Output: XfA,z0 ,X
f
B,z0
%Filtered RSSI sequences
1 YB = DCT (XB)
2 for z ← 1 to Z do
3 YB(z) = 0
4 XfB,z = IDCT (YB)
5 Bob calculates H(XB |XfB,z)
6 z0 = argmax
z
∇H(XB |XfB,z) + 1
7 Bob sends z0 to Alice
8 Alice and Bob calculate large-scale fading filtered
sequences, XfA,z0 and X
f
B,z0
, respectively.
B. Filtering Effect
We use (9) and (10) to analyze secret key capacity and intact
key information ratio for filtered RSSI sequences, which are
denoted by CfK and R
f
CK
, respectively. We considered two
cases.
• A worst-case scenario assumes that eavesdroppers know
all the filtered components and develop the same filtering
process as Alice and Bob.
• A general case assumes that eavesdroppers have no
knowledge about the filtered components.
Fig. 6 shows the high-pass filtering result for an outdoor
large-scale fading varying channel. The resulted secret key
capacities in both general and worst cases are significantly
improved, with the maximum improvement occurs after filter-
ing the first nine components. When more components are
filtered, the secret key capacities start to drop. The secret
key capacity improvement is contributed by the elimination
of large-scale fading variation, which reduces the channel
correlation between the colluding-eavesdropping attack and
legitimate users. After filtering the first seventy components,
the secret key capacities go below the original value. This is
because the high-pass filter starts to affect small-scale fading,
and the entire entropy of the RSSI sequences is reduced.
Fig. 7 shows the high-pass filtering result for outdoor channels
without large-scale fading variation, i.e., scenario (Ob). As
there was no large-scale fading, the resulted secret key capacity
is almost always smaller than the original capacity. This
is caused by entropy reduction as filtered components are
associated with small-scale fading.
As can be observed in Fig. 6, an optimal secret key capacity
can be achieved by filtering the first z0 = 9 components. This
is obtained by knowing all RSSI sequences of Alice, Bob,
and eavesdroppers. However, this cannot be done in practice
as Alice and Bob are not allowed to exchange their measured
RSSI sequences. Furthermore, they do not have access to the
RSSI sequences of eavesdroppers. Therefore, we carried out
Algorithm 1 to let Bob develop large-scale fading filtering
base on his RSSI observations. Figs. 8(a), (b), and (c) show
the estimated z0 in the scenario (Od) when r = 5λ, r = 4λ,
and r = 2λ. The estimated z0 are 8, 7, and 7, respectively.
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Fig. 6. Secret key capacity and intact key information ratio after filtering
low-frequency components of the RSSI sequences measured in the scenario
(Od) with r = 3λ.
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Fig. 7. Average secret key capacity and intact key information ratio after
filtering low-frequency components of the RSSI sequences measured in the
scenario (Ob).
All the resulted secret key capacities from the z0 are higher
than the original secret key capacities. Although Alice and
Bob choose z0 without knowing eavesdroppers’ information,
they can achieve a secret key capacity closing to the optimal
value.
C. Key Disagreement Rate and Randomness
We implemented a mean-based quantizer to convert RSSI
sequences into key bits. A mean value-based quantizer is
mathematically given as follows.
Ku(i) =
{
1, Xu(n) > µu; (12a)
0, Xu(n) ≤ µu, (12b)
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(c)
Fig. 8. The optimal filter size, z0, estimated with Bob’s RSSI measurements. The star denotes the secret key capacity after implementing the corresponding
optimal filter in the scenario (Od), where the red star denotes the general case, and the pink star denotes the worst case. (a) r = 5λ. (b) r = 4λ. (c) r = 2λ.
TABLE VII
KDR BEFORE AND AFTER LARGE-SCALE FADING FILTERING
Scenario r
KDRA,B KDRA,Ec
Before After Before After
(Od)
5λ 0.1026 0.1359 0.2456 0.4798
4λ 0.1055 0.1424 0.2581 0.4870
3λ 0.0798 0.1078 0.2563 0.4891
2λ 0.0708 0.1056 0.2524 0.4943
where µu = E{Xu} is the mean value. Before quantization,
we downsampled experimental RSSI sequences to generate
key bits with desirable length, lk.
Key disagreement rate (KDR) and randomness are common
evaluation metrics in the key generation area [7]. KDR is
defined as the ratio between the numbers of different key bits
and total key bits, expressed as
KDRu,v =
∑lk
n=1 |Ku(n)−Kv(n)|
lk
. (13)
The values of KDR should close to 0 when keys are associated
with legitimate users and close to 0.5 when associated with
eavesdroppers. The tolerable KDR is determined by the fol-
lowing information reconciliation stage, which will correct key
bit mismatches using error-correcting codes. The correcting
capacity of information reconciliation depends on the adopted
error correction code. A correction capacity of 0.2 is used in
this paper [35].
Table VII shows the KDR results, where eavesdroppers
developed the same large-scale fading filtering process as
Alice and Bob. All KDR increased as large-scale fading was
filtered. However, the KDR associated with the colluding-
eavesdropping attack increased more significantly than those
of legitimate users. The KDR between legitimate users is all
within 0.2, hence they can correct the mismatches. On the
other hand, all the KDR associated with eavesdroppers is close
to 0.5, which is no better than a random guess.
We used the National Institute of Standard and Technology
(NIST) randomness test suite to evaluate the randomness of
TABLE VIII
RANDOMNESS TEST RESULTS OF LARGE-SCALE FADING FILTERED KEY
BITS GENERATED BY BOB
Scenario (Od)
r 5λ 4λ 3λ 2λ
Sequence Length 256 256 256 256
Frequency 0.731 0.169 0.617 0.134
Block Frequency 0.119 0.265 0.779 0.315
Runs 0.093 0.144 0.284 0.263
Longest Run of 1s 0.140 0.248 0.280 0.140
FFT 0.359 0.731 0.819 0.422
Serial 0.4990.499
0.978
0.998
0.841
0.922
0.841
0.760
Appro. Entropy 0.067 0.105 0.150 0.416
Cum. Sums (rev) 0.091 0.301 0.746 0.208
Cum. Sums (fwd) 0.110 0.236 0.991 0.236
key bits generated from filtered RSSI sequences. Each test
returns a p-value, and the test passes if the p-value is larger
than 0.01. The randomness test results of the key bits generated
by Bob after large-scale fading filtering is shown in Table VIII,
and all tests passed.
Overall, as a security recommendation and an effective
countermeasure against our revealed new attack, a high-pass
filter can be implemented with Algorithm 1 to effectively
minimize the secret key information leaked by large-scale
fading variation in practice.
VII. CONCLUSION
The paper investigated the key generation security when
there are both large-scale and small-scale fading effects. In
particular, we constructed a LoRa-based key generation testbed
and carried out extensive experiments in indoor and outdoor
environments. A new colluding-eavesdropping attack that per-
ceives large-scale fading effects was revealed and formalized,
using only four eavesdroppers circularly around a legitimate
user. Through the cross-correlation and secret key capacity
analysis, we demonstrated that the RSSI sequences generated
in a large-scale fading varying channel are more predictable
11
than no large-scale fading variation. Therefore, a higher por-
tion of secret keys can be compromised under the revealed
attack. Furthermore, through the intact key information ratio
analysis, we found that the colluding-eavesdropping attack’s
capability can be boosted by signal pre-processing techniques
that are designed initially to improve channel probing reci-
procity for generating highly agreed key bits. Finally, we
proposed a high-pass filtering-based countermeasure for the
colluding-eavesdropping attack as the impact of large-scale
fading variation persists for a long duration. In this context, we
designed an algorithm to allow key generation users to adap-
tively estimate the large-scale fading associated low-frequency
components based on their channel observations. The results
demonstrated that the countermeasure can improve the users’
secret key capacity significantly and increase eavesdroppers’
KDR almost twice under a large-scale fading resulted key
generation attack. The NIST randomness test suite validated
the randomness of the filtered key sequences, which would be
suitable for cryptographic applications.
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